Eastern Asia averages 4.80 points of control and a complexity score of 1.54 across 510 million IP addresses, while Eastern Europe averages 19.10 PoC and a complexity score of 11.35 across 74 million IPs — nearly twice the complexity of any other region. Russia specifically has 2,346 autonomous systems and a complexity score of 19.39, versus China's 177 ASes and score of 0.11.

Russia's high AS complexity (score 19.39, 2,346 ASes) enabled the Russian Business Network to hide malware-hosting ASes by chaining traffic through multiple intermediate legitimate-seeming ASes, making connections very difficult to trace and sever. The paper concludes that higher national AS complexity directly raises the operational cost of enumerating and cutting any given connection.

§IV, §VI defense

China has only 3 points of control covering approximately 240 million IP addresses (roughly 80 million IPs per point of control), the lowest ratio among large-population countries. This enabled China to cut off nearly all Internet access for the Xinjiang region for ten months beginning July 2009.

§II, §VI deployment

By 2009, the top 150 autonomous systems carried approximately 50% of all Internet traffic globally, up from roughly 30% in 2007. Akamai alone claimed approximately 20% of all web traffic, and the proposed Level 3 / Global Crossing merger would have covered over half the world's IP addresses.

§I evaluation

Iran and Libya each have a single point of control (1 AS), making complete national internet shutdown achievable with a single administrative action. Egypt's 2011 shutdown left one AS (Noor Group, 4.9% of connected IPs) operational for four days, apparently due to its role serving the Egyptian stock exchange and other core financial institutions.

§VI, Figure 7 deployment

Brussee measures a systematic pattern of Chinese government websites actively blocking access from outside China (the "reverse Great Firewall"), publishing a CSV dataset of affected domains (available at zenodo.org/records/18172145). The paper frames this outbound geo-blocking as a cybersecurity-motivated practice — Chinese authorities classify foreign access to domestic government infrastructure as an attack surface — distinct from the inbound information control goal of the GFW.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §3, §5 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

Brussee develops a conceptual framework distinguishing two logics of government geo-blocking: (1) information control (blocking inbound foreign content from domestic users) and (2) data sovereignty / attack-surface reduction (blocking outbound access by foreign actors to domestic systems). Chinese government site blocking of external IPs is motivated primarily by the second logic, creating an asymmetric internet topology where CN citizens cannot reach the outside world, and outside actors cannot probe CN government infrastructure.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §2, §4 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

The April 2026 enforcement wave against Chinese VPN resellers operates primarily through administrative "reporting + line-cutting" (通报+拔线) mechanisms enforced via Ministry of Industry and Information Technology bulletins, not packet-level DPI changes. Operators report that newly acquired upstream resources are reported and cut with recovery periods described as "uncontrollable," and that upstream providers typically do not refund resellers after enforcement actions.

2026-ermao-april-airport-outage §一句话结论 / §这轮波动到底发生了什么 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

The dominant enforcement mechanism in April 2026 was administrative 'reporting + line-cutting' (通报 + 拔线) backed by MIIT bulletins, not protocol-level DPI changes. Operators reported that newly acquired upstream resources were reported to authorities quickly after acquisition, recovery timelines were uncontrollable, and some upstream providers refused refunds after enforcement actions, producing sustained capacity contraction across the shared VPN-reseller ecosystem.

2026-ermao-april-airport-outage §这轮波动到底发生了什么 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

The April 2026 enforcement cycle created a resource-scarcity feedback loop: upstream providers cut lines with no obligation to refund resellers, newly acquired replacement resources can themselves be reported and cut within days, and stable-resource availability windows are described as "越来越短" (increasingly short) while costs rise concurrently. The overall effect is systemic capacity contraction forecast to continue through at least May 2026.

2026-ermao-april-airport-outage §这轮波动到底发生了什么 / §四月后的趋势判断 ip-blockingasn-blackholingthrottling

Shared domestic-entry transit architectures (国内入口 + 海外转发) suffered disproportionate impact because all nodes sharing a single domestic entry point went down simultaneously when that entry was reported and cut. Operators described configurations degrading from 'three-line redundancy to single entry,' eliminating failover capacity under enforcement pressure.

2026-ermao-april-airport-outage §为什么中转机场这次受冲击更明显 ip-blockingasn-blackholing