Iran's protocol filter monitors only the first two data-carrying packets of a TCP connection on ports 53, 80, and 443, permitting only DNS, HTTP, and HTTPS. Once tripped, it drops all subsequent client-side packets for 60 seconds, with the timer resetting on each TCP retransmit. The filter is unidirectional (client-inside-Iran only), cannot reassemble TCP segments, and does not verify checksums.

Using Geneva's genetic algorithm trained against Iran's live protocol filter, four evasion strategies achieving 100% success were discovered in under two hours: (1) injecting a fingerprint-matching PSH/ACK with a corrupt checksum before the real data; (2) sending two FIN packets before the SYN; (3) sending nine non-data-carrying packets (any flags, any seq/ack) during the handshake to exhaust the filter's per-flow packet limit; (4) a server-side variant that sends nine corrupted SYN+ACKs, inducing nine client RSTs before the real ACK, enabling fully unmodified clients to benefit.

§5.2–§5.3 defense

The protocol filter's HTTPS fingerprint requires only that the first 5 bytes match a TLS header (type 0x16, version 0x03 0x01–0x03, correct length field); all subsequent bytes of the Client Hello are unchecked. Any TLS-based circumvention tool naturally satisfies this fingerprint and will bypass the filter by default. Furthermore, any one of the three permitted fingerprints (DNS, HTTP, HTTPS) can be used on any of the three monitored ports to whitelist an entire flow.

§4.3 defense

Testing the Alexa top-20,000 websites from within Iran, 3,595 IP addresses (17.9%) triggered the protocol filter at least 8 out of 10 times, and 3,499 (17.4%) were affected all 10 times. IP address provider is not correlated with filtering; instead, specific IP prefixes are targeted—for Cloudflare, only two prefixes (104.18.0.0/16 and 104.31.82.0/24) were fully affected while all others were unaffected.

§4.2 evaluation

Existing segmentation strategies effective against Iran's standard HTTP DPI can be counterproductive when the protocol filter is also active: if the first segment is fewer than 8 bytes, it fails the HTTP fingerprint check and trips the filter. However, segmenting such that the first segment is a valid HTTP fingerprint (≥8 bytes, well-formed verb + space) while splitting the Host: header into the second segment defeats both the protocol filter and the standard DPI censor simultaneously.

§5.1 defense

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

During the June 2025 shutdown, Iranian authorities blocked international One-Time Password (OTP) SMS delivery, preventing new sign-ins to foreign secure-messaging platforms and VPN services. This forced users toward government-approved domestic platforms that lack security and privacy protections. The blockade of OTPs effectively weaponized account-recovery flows as a secondary shutdown layer, disproportionately affecting users who needed to activate new circumvention tools during the crisis.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement §Human Rights Implications port-blockingdpikeyword-filtering

VPN search demand in Iran spiked approximately 707% during the June 2025 stealth blackout, as measured by Top10VPN analytics, making it one of the highest-documented circumvention-demand spikes associated with a single shutdown event. Despite this demand, many VPN connections failed because the protocol whitelist eliminated non-HTTPS tunneling methods and HTTP-level filters could detect known VPN signatures on port 443.

2025-aryapour-stealth-blackout §1, §5 dpiport-blockingtraffic-shape

Iran's June 2025 shutdown enforced a strict national protocol whitelist: only DNS (UDP/53), HTTP (port 80), and HTTPS (port 443) traffic from Iranian networks to external servers was forwarded; all other protocols—including OpenVPN (UDP/1194), SSH (port 22), and arbitrary TCP/UDP ports—were silently dropped without response by DPI at the border.

2025-aryapour-stealth-blackout §4.4 dpiport-blockingfully-encrypted-detect

The August 20, 2025 unconditional RST event revealed an asymmetry in the GFW's triggering mechanism: for traffic originating inside China, both the client SYN and the server SYN+ACK each independently triggered three injected RST+ACK packets (six total per connection). For traffic to China from outside, only the Chinese server's SYN+ACK triggered RSTs — the foreign client's SYN alone was insufficient. This asymmetry implies the responsible device observed the SYN+ACK from the Chinese server as the trigger condition, not a port-match rule on the SYN.

2025-gfw-port443-rst §2.1, §2.2 rst-injectionport-blockingdpi

The June 2025 Iran shutdown achieved approximately 90% reduction in international traffic without BGP withdrawal by combining DNS poisoning, protocol whitelisting, and DPI at the national border — maintaining an outward appearance of normal connectivity for traditional monitoring tools while severing the population's access to the global Internet. Unlike the 2019 shutdown, which was implemented per-provider over 24+ hours, the 2025 operation was centralized and covert.

2025-miaan-stealth-blackout Executive Summary — Technical and Strategic Evolution dns-poisoningdpiport-blocking