2013-houmansadr-i
findings extracted from this paper
-
FreeWave over Skype reliably achieves 16 kbps for clients in Berlin, Frankfurt, Paris, and the UK (0% packet drop) and 19.2 kbps for Chicago, IL (0.01% drop), using 4-QAM with 8–9.6 kHz symbol rate and rate-0.5 Turbo channel coding. The maximum achievable bit rate is hard-bounded by the VoIP codec's sampling rate: 40 kbps for Skype SILK, 64 kbps for G.711, and 128 kbps for the L16 codec.
-
Protocol mimicry approaches (SkypeMorph, StegoTorus, CensorSpoofer) do not execute the target protocol in full and leave detectable discrepancies: SkypeMorph fails to replicate Skype's TCP handshake, and CensorSpoofer's IP-spoofing downstream channel enables active traffic analysis by censors who can inject manipulated packets and observe whether the purported VoIP endpoint reacts. The authors state that morphing approaches provide no provable indistinguishability, and protocol evolution further invalidates mimicry over time.
-
FreeWave-over-Skype produces traffic statistically indistinguishable from genuine Skype-Speak state: average packet rate 49.91 pps vs. 50.31 pps for Skype-Speak, and average packet size 148.64 bytes vs. 146.50 bytes. However, the Skype-Silent state generates distinctly lower rates (49.57 pps, 103.97 bytes avg), creating a detectable anomaly when both FreeWave endpoints appear to be 'speaking' simultaneously rather than alternating.
-
Because FreeWave is VoIP-provider-agnostic, blocking it requires censors to block all VoIP services simultaneously — a politically and economically costly action given that approximately one-third of U.S. businesses used VoIP by 2011 and penetration was forecast to reach 79% by 2013. The authors argue this collateral-damage cost makes wholesale VoIP blocking infeasible for most censors.
-
FreeWave routes client VoIP connections through oblivious intermediary nodes (e.g., Skype supernodes) rather than directly to the FreeWave server, so even if a censor discovers the server's VoIP ID or IP address it cannot block clients via IP filtering. This 'server obfuscation' is absent from SkypeMorph and StegoTorus; the authors note that Chinese censors enumerated all Tor bridges—on which SkypeMorph depends—in under a month, rendering those transports instantly blockable.