2013-ruffing-identity-based
findings extracted from this paper
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For a Collage-style system with T forward-security time intervals and k rendezvous-point identities (e.g., k popular Flickr hashtags), standard public-key steganography requires distributing kT public keys, whereas an IBST-based solution requires distributing only 1 master public key. This reduction is exact — the paper states it verbatim as an efficiency argument.
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Key distribution is the primary bootstrapping weakness of steganography-based censorship-resistance systems: a censor can simply block stego-key distribution. Identity-based steganographic tagging (IBST) eliminates this attack surface by requiring only a single master public key, which can be bundled with the client software — no key distribution inside the censored area is necessary.
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The IBST construction is provably secure under the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) assumption in the random oracle model. Any adversary with advantage ε(λ) against IBST indistinguishability implies an adversary against BDDH with advantage at least ε(λ)/e(1+qE), where qE is the number of private-key extraction queries. Tags produced by the scheme are computationally indistinguishable from uniform random bitstrings for any party lacking the recipient's private key.
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Replacing Telex's original stego-tagging with the IBST scheme and using time periods as identities achieves eventual forward security with arbitrarily short rotation intervals. The key material a client needs after a master-key rotation is only the new master public key — 'a few hundred bytes' — small enough to fit in covert channels such as steganographic images, avoiding the original Telex design's problem of large bundled key sets expiring before a client updates its software.
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The paper proves that immediate forward security is impossible for Telex-like decoy-routing systems. The Telex station must decide whether to treat a connection as a Telex request after the first client message, using only received messages and its long-term key — an eavesdropper who stores all network traffic can replay the station's entire view once it compromises the station's long-term key, retroactively decrypting all sessions.