2025-interseclab-internet-coup
The Internet Coupcore
Abstract
76-page consortium report based on a nine-month indexing, translation,
and analysis effort over the ~600 GB Geedge/MESA leak. Documents how
China's domestic censorship infrastructure has been productized and
exported through Geedge Networks to states including Myanmar, Pakistan,
Ethiopia, and Kazakhstan, with technical detail on the Tiangou Secure
Gateway (TSG) product line and its detection capabilities.
Team notes
Of the analyses published alongside the leak, InterSecLab's is the
most thorough technical read — they spent nine months on it. For
Lantern protocol designers, this is the highest-leverage way to
extract threat-model intelligence from the leak without working
through the raw 600 GB. Pay particular attention to TSG product
documentation: Geedge's productized GFW provides a clearer view
of what detection capabilities are commercially deployable in
customer states (vs. only deployed by the CN national operator).
When designing for IR / RU / etc., assume Geedge or a Geedge-derived
product is at least *available* to the censor, even where there's no
public deployment evidence yet.