Iran: Internet shutdown from 18:45 UTC 8 January 2026

During the January 8–9, 2026 shutdown, Iran's .ir DNS zone became unavailable in-country, with resolution routed exclusively to a single nameserver located in Amsterdam. This infrastructure takeover was simultaneous with the routing blackout, eliminating DNS as an independent resolution path.

§Abstract deployment dns-poisoningbgp-hijack ir

Iran executed a full-stack internet shutdown beginning at 18:45 UTC on January 8, 2026, withdrawing BGP prefix announcements nationwide and causing routing failures that prevented clients from completing TCP handshakes. Traffic dropped to effectively zero within hours of the shutdown's onset.

§Issue body / Abstract deployment bgp-hijackip-blocking ir

The January 2026 Iranian shutdown encompassed not only global internet connectivity but also domestic inter-network connectivity and PSTN telephony — even domestic phone calls were reported impossible during the blackout period. This represents a broader telecommunications blockade beyond IP-layer isolation.

§Issue body deployment bgp-hijackport-blocking ir

Iran's January 8, 2026 shutdown was confirmed by Cloudflare Radar traffic telemetry showing a near-instantaneous collapse in Iranian internet traffic to effectively zero. The shutdown was implemented rapidly enough that the Cloudflare Radar timestamp (18:45 UTC) serves as a precise onset marker.

§Issue body / Cloudflare Radar source evaluation bgp-hijack ir