2022-huangshaomings001-google-auto-jump
findings extracted from this paper
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The redirect from google.com to google.cn/m on proxied Android connections in China is ambiguous as to origin: it may represent GFW-side in-path HTTP redirect packet injection, or Google's server-side geo-redirect responding to signals (device locale, exit IP, or Accept-Language headers) that survive the proxy hop. The thread documents this as an unresolved mechanistic question requiring disambiguation.
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Chinese users accessing google.com on Android devices through circumvention proxies experience forced HTTP redirects to google.cn/m rather than the expected google.com destination. The behavior is observed specifically on proxied connections, suggesting either in-path HTTP redirect injection by the GFW or Google's own geo-targeting logic acting on IP or device signals that persist through the proxy.
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Android users in China accessing google.com through circumvention tools report forced redirection to google.cn/m instead of the expected GFW block page. The thread investigates three possible mechanisms: GFW HTTP packet injection, Google's server-side geolocation redirect, or ISP-level interference—each implying a different interception layer.
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Appending the /ncr (no-country-redirect) parameter to google.com requests successfully bypasses the forced redirect to google.cn/m for Chinese users on circumvention proxies. This workaround operates at the application layer and requires no changes to the underlying transport or proxy configuration.
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The redirect behavior varies depending on which proxy type is used, indicating the interception is sensitive to how the proxy mediates the connection rather than being a blanket IP- or DNS-level block. This suggests the triggering condition is protocol- or flow-specific rather than purely destination-based.