A freshly provisioned VPN server in Myanmar was functional for approximately 5 hours before its IP address was completely blocked across all connection methods, indicating the Myanmar filtering infrastructure performs rapid active detection and IP blacklisting of new proxy endpoints.

Beginning November 1st, 2025, Myanmar users reported severely asymmetric internet speeds: download speeds were near-unusable while upload speeds remained at normal maximum capacity, a pattern inconsistent with submarine cable faults which typically degrade both directions.

Issue body deployment

Community technical analysis of the November 2025 Myanmar disruption concluded the observed symptom cluster — unidirectional throttling, rapid VPN IP blocking, and selective service allowlisting — is inconsistent with submarine cable faults and instead indicates deployment of new national-level traffic filtering infrastructure, consistent with GFW-derived Geedge filtering technology previously documented in Myanmar.

Issue body evaluation

During peak disruption periods in Myanmar (post November 1st, 2025), users observed a 'walled garden' effect where the entire internet dropped except for Google and YouTube, which remained selectively accessible — consistent with allowlist-based national firewall policy rather than infrastructure failure.

Issue body deployment

CensorLess's function refresher automatically retires serverless bridges and deploys fresh ones in batches across diverse regions; the expected time until a bridge is identified and blocked in practice is 2 days (per Fifield et al.), while Tor bridges in China are discovered within 2–36 days. The old bridge is only removed after all clients have completed live migration to a new URL, maintaining uninterrupted connectivity.

2026-kang-censorless-serverless §4.5 active-probingip-blocking

CensorLess's threat model explicitly relies on a rational-censor assumption: the censor will not block entire cloud-provider IP ranges or domain namespaces because the collateral damage to legitimate business services would be politically and economically unacceptable. AWS Lambda's inherent IP-address ephemerality (new IPs on each invocation, function lifetime up to 15 minutes) means even censors willing to attempt enumeration face a continuously shifting target distributed across the cloud provider's global address space.

2026-kang-censorless-serverless §4.2 ip-blockingasn-blackholingactive-probing

Address blocking is a losing strategy for the censor: with n=8 endpoints and µ/λa = 1 (discovery as fast as rotation), address-denial probability falls below 10^-2, and even when the censor discovers twice as fast as the defender rotates (µ/λa = 0.5), 7 endpoints keep address denial below 10^-2 (Lemma 1, Figure 1). The collateral budget γ means the censor cannot even block all addresses it discovers, and Corollary 1 gives the explicit threshold: n ≥ ln(1/ε) / ln((λa+µ)/λa) endpoints suffice for any target ε.

2026-maiti-block-a-mole-sustainability-frontier §5, §8.1, §8.10, Lemma 1, Corollary 1, Figure 1 ip-blockingactive-probing

Community members propose a two-hop architecture as a potential mitigation for Iran's current DPI upgrade: a first-hop server inside Iran's whitelisted datacenter ranges (where outbound traffic faces lighter inspection) proxying to a foreign exit node, with Reality masquerading as a legitimate Iranian organization's domain. The architecture's effectiveness under active TCP reassembly and handshake probing is explicitly unverified.

2026-pooribitwise-iran-advanced-dpi Issue body — Description active-probingip-blocking

A community scan of the I2P network database (netDb) in July 2026 identified a cluster of suspicious router nodes uniformly running I2P version 0.9.66 (three versions behind the current 0.9.69), all hosted in Chinese domestic data centers rather than residential broadband. The nodes exhibit anomalous uniformity in their router capabilities (Caps) configuration and self-reported versions, a pattern inconsistent with organic user deployments.

2026-thewizard0fbsod-quirky-chinese-i2p Issue body active-probingip-blocking

The suspicious Chinese I2P nodes rotate their IP addresses regularly and simultaneously as a coordinated group, and some of the observed IPs have prior history of malicious behavior (SSH brute-forcing, remote exploitation) in threat-intelligence databases. Simultaneous coordinated IP rotation distinguishes state-run infrastructure from organic users and is a fingerprint of centrally managed probe fleets.

2026-thewizard0fbsod-quirky-chinese-i2p Issue body active-probingip-blocking