During peak disruption periods in Myanmar (post November 1st, 2025), users observed a 'walled garden' effect where the entire internet dropped except for Google and YouTube, which remained selectively accessible — consistent with allowlist-based national firewall policy rather than infrastructure failure.

Beginning November 1st, 2025, Myanmar users reported severely asymmetric internet speeds: download speeds were near-unusable while upload speeds remained at normal maximum capacity, a pattern inconsistent with submarine cable faults which typically degrade both directions.

Issue body deployment

Community technical analysis of the November 2025 Myanmar disruption concluded the observed symptom cluster — unidirectional throttling, rapid VPN IP blocking, and selective service allowlisting — is inconsistent with submarine cable faults and instead indicates deployment of new national-level traffic filtering infrastructure, consistent with GFW-derived Geedge filtering technology previously documented in Myanmar.

Issue body evaluation

A freshly provisioned VPN server in Myanmar was functional for approximately 5 hours before its IP address was completely blocked across all connection methods, indicating the Myanmar filtering infrastructure performs rapid active detection and IP blacklisting of new proxy endpoints.

Issue body detection

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

TSG's Context-Based Detector (CBD) evaluates circumvention tool signatures across JA3/JA4 TLS fingerprints, SSL certificate issuer fields, UDP payload length, first-packet byte patterns, server IP ranges, and FQDN matches, often combining multiple conditions with logical AND. Of 29 VPN and circumvention tool signatures logged in the VPN Signature File Update Log (March–November 2024), 21 carry risk level 5 (the maximum), indicating aggressive prioritization of blocking major tools including ExpressVPN, NordVPN, Tor Browser, and Psiphon.

2026-ablove-technical-analysis-geedge §4.1, §4.1.2, Table 3, Table 4 dpitls-fingerprinttraffic-shapeip-blockingsni-blocking

Internal Jira tickets reveal that Psiphon lacked obvious protocol signatures, forcing censors to fall back to IP-based blocking of Psiphon3 client IPs combined with a 'whitelist protection mechanism' that allows traffic when the destination SNI matches a popular domain—an explicit collateral-damage tradeoff documented in the Confluence file 'GTN498 The collateral damage analysis of Psiphon3 Blocking.' A ticket from the Ethiopia (E21) deployment shows customers complaining that the VPN deny policy inadvertently blocked non-VPN applications.

2026-ablove-technical-analysis-geedge §4.1.2, Figure 2, Figure 3 ip-blockingsni-blocking

IPv6 does not inherently worsen fingerprinting privacy: dual-stack complete sites are measurably harder to fingerprint via IPv6 (45%) than IPv4 (56%), contrary to community fears. The key driver is not the protocol but hosting provider behavior—Cloudflare, Google, and Fastly co-locate large clusters of domains behind a small set of shared IPv6 addresses, creating structured similarity clusters that reduce classifier separability, while Amazon allocates domains across vast unique IPv6 prefixes, increasing fingerprintability.

2026-ahmad-more-space-less §7.1, §6.1, §6.2 website-fingerprintip-blocking

Across three testers all on MTS, whitelist behavior varied by network segment in ways that could not be explained by protocol configuration alone; the operator has zero confirmed data for MegaFon, Beeline, or T2 under whitelist conditions. The open question of whether whitelist policy (site+IP list) is centrally issued by the Ministry of Digital Development while implementation differs per carrier remains unresolved, making cross-carrier generalization of any circumvention finding unreliable.

2026-amigocarra-bypassing-russian-federation-s Issue body — questions 1 and 2 ip-blockingsni-blocking

During apparent whitelist-activation periods on MTS mobile LTE, the affected user experienced a complete network blackout in which even explicitly whitelisted resources (gosuslugi.ru) were inaccessible — behavior inconsistent with a standard default-deny CIDR+SNI whitelist, which should pass approved destinations unconditionally. The operator concludes this may represent a stricter enforcement variant, a SIM-specific restriction, or a mechanism entirely separate from the documented whitelist architecture.

2026-amigocarra-bypassing-russian-federation-s Issue body — main mystery paragraph ip-blockingsni-blocking